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I. INTRODUCTION

Mandatory arbitration provisions in employment contracts, are
generally embraced by the federal courts.2 In the end, the federal courts
sanction what amounts to the waiver of employees' enforcement of Title
VII and other important statutory claims through the courts.' This result is
problematic for employees because the federal court decisions limit the
statutory rights that Congress established to address the important social
issues recognized in Title VII. Consequently, mandatory arbitration in the
employment context conflicts with the statutory rights of employees. The

1. Reginald B. Henderson, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Erisa
Fiduciary Claims: The Courts Unfortunately Declare Them a Perfect Match, 26 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 27, 28 (2002).
2. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act is subject to arbitration); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Saint Clair
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (recognizing that employment contracts, with the exception of
those covering transportation workers, are covered by the FAA); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534
U.S. 279 (2002) (embracing the arbitration of an ADA claim, but finding that an arbitration clause
does not prevent the EEOC from filing a workplace discrimination lawsuit or from seeking victimspecific reliefs). Similarly, other federal appellate courts have embraced arbitration of employmentrelated statutory claims. See Desiderio v. NASD, 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999) (embracing
arbitration for Title VII claims); Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995)
(embracing arbitration for Older Workers Benefit Protection Act claims); Metz v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994) (embracing arbitration for pregnancy
discrimination claims); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992)
(embracing arbitration for sexual harassment claims); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.,
968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 986 (1992) (embracing arbitration for
Employee Polygraph Protection Act claims).
3. A host of statutory claims including claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, are subject to resolution through arbitration. By reasoning that arbitration agreements deal with
the method of enforcing employees' substantive rights rather than limiting their substantive rights,
courts are able to rationalize enforcement of arbitration agreements. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (2002).
It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration
agreement .... Indeed, in recent years we have held enforceable arbitration
agreements relating to claims arising under the Sherman Act... [, claims arising
under] the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act... [, and claims arising under] the Securities Act of 1933. In these cases we
recognized that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."
Id. at 26 (citations omitted).

MANDA TORY PRE-EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

use of mandatory arbitration in the employment context must be examined
to ensure that employees have an effective and meaningful enforcement
mechanism for their Title VII rights.
The need for reform is exacerbated when considering the routine use
of mandatory arbitration in employment matters. The use of mandatory
arbitration, in employment disputes regarding Title VII, has increased a
great deal since 1991 due to the enhanced remedies provided under the
Civil Rights Act of 199 . The number of lawsuits in this area has grown5
and the use of arbitration to resolve these disputes has likewise risen.'
This Article provides an overview of mandatory arbitration provisions
in the employment context. It analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of this
practice, the legal basis for such agreements emphasizing recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence, and the practical and public policy concerns with the
current state of the law. The Article concludes with a call for reform.
II. MANDATORY

ARBITRATION IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

A. Mandatory Arbitration Generally
Mandatory arbitration clauses in the employment context are in
collective bargaining agreements or individual employment contracts.7 The
focus of this Article is the latter type situations. Mandatory arbitration is
not as problematic in the collective bargaining context because the parties

4. MarcelaNoemi Siderman, Comment, CompulsoryArbitrationAgreements Worth Saving:
ReformingArbitrationtoAccommodate Title VllProtections,47 UCLA L. REv. 1885, 1886 (2000).
5. Rebecca K. Beerling, Comment, Left Out of the Balance-The Public's Need for
ProtectionAgainstWorkplace Discrimination:Waffle House andKidder PeabodyAttempt to Limit
the Remedies Available to the EEOC by BalancingPolicies Not in Conflict, 25 HAMLINE L. REV.
295, 296 (2002) (noting that in the year 2000 there were nearly eighty thousand claims of
discrimination filed with the EEOC, and that sexual harassment complaints with the EEOC have
continually increased at a rate of over five thousand a year since 1992).
6. Siderman, supra note 4, at 1886. See also Patricia Lynch et al., Employment Arbitration
Agreements in the Non- Union Workplace: Failureto Meet MinimalStandardsof Fairness?,EMP.
& LAB. L.Q., Fall 2001, at 3 (recognizing the significant increase in the use of compulsory
arbitration agreements in the employment context over the last decade); Kate Andrias, What do
Circuit City, Waffle House, and Labor Ready Have in Common? The Companies All Force
Employees to Sign Away Their Rights to Court, LEGAL AFF., June 2004, at 27 (recognizing that
over 600 companies, covering seven million workers, received dispute resolution services from the
American Arbitration Association).
7. Henderson, supra note 1, at 30.
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entering into the contract are on a relatively even playing field;' however,
this is not the case in most individual employment contracts.
Employers routinely require employees to enter into pre-employment
contracts wherein the employee gives up the right to pursue any claims
against the employer, including Title VII and other statutory claims. 9
These are largely "take it or leave it" employment contracts and the
employee has little to no bargaining power.' Often, the signing of a
mandatory arbitration agreement is a condition of employment," and in
some cases, it is included in the employment application. 2 Applicants who
are limited in3 employment options are essentially required to sign such
agreements.'

8. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Arbitrationof Statutory Claims in the Unionized Workplace:
Is Bargainingwith the Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 513, 538-39 (2001).
9. Siderman, supranote 4, at 1877; see Andrias,supra note 6 (recognizing that the potential
liability faced by national employers in nationwide lawsuits has led these employers to take
measures limiting liability in litigation by requiring employees to waive their right to pursue claims
in court as a condition of employment).
10. Siderman, supra note 4, at 1877.
11. Henderson, supra note 1, at 3 1.
12. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). Likewise, in CircuitCity Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, an employee signed an arbitration provision as a part of an application. 532 U.S. 105
(2001). The provision was broad and subjected a wide range of statutory rights to arbitration. See
id. The arbitration agreement provided as follows:
I agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or
controversies arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for
employment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City,
exclusively by final and binding arbitrationbefore a neutral arbitrator. By way of
example only, such claims include claims under federal, state, and local statutory
or common law, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the amendments of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the law of contract and
the law of tort.
Id. at 109-10.
13. Lynch et al., supra note 6, at 3.
The employer requires the employee to agree to the arbitration provision as a
condition of employment (or continued employment) and the employee is left with
little choice if she or he wants the job, . .. The implicit coercion arises when the
employee's livelihood is interwoven with his or her agreement to the private
arbitration provision.

MANDATORY PRE-EMPLOYMENTARBITRA TIONAGREEMENTS

When a dispute arises and such an arbitration agreement is in place, the
parties will present their case to an arbitrator 4 in an arbitration hearing.' 5
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply, the arbitrator will
hear the dispute, consider the written and oral arguments, and render a
decision. 6 The arbitrator's decision is binding; however, there are limited
grounds for appeal based on egregious conducts including bias, corruption,
and fraud.' 7
B. Benefits of MandatoryArbitration
For the court system, mandatory arbitration increases judicial
efficiency by reducing the courts' dockets. 8 For employers, the
informality and flexibility of mandatory expeditious, and less expensive
than proceeding through the court system.' 9 Mandatory arbitration saves
the employer large amounts of money as compared to protracted
litigation.2 °
However, mandatory arbitration can also be an efficient and effective
way to resolve employment disputes for employees. 2' Litigation can take
years, and it is often difficult for employees to retain competent legal
counsel for routine and marginal cases.22 Consequently, many employees
are not able to enforce their rights and resolve their disputes. 23 Relying
solely on the court system may leave many employees without means to

14. An arbitrator is "a neutral third party who renders a decision between two contending
parties who cannot mutually arrive at a satisfactory resolution of their conflict." Lynch et al., supra
note 6, at 5 (citing DOUGLAS M. MCCABE, CORPORATE NONUNION COMPLAINT PROCEDURES AND
SYSTEMS 65 n. 14 (1988); Michael R. Holden, Arbitrationof State-Law Claims by Employees: An
Argument for ContinuingFederalArbitrationLaw, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1695, 1699 (1995)).
15. Henderson, supra note 1, at 32-33.
16. Id. at 33.
17. Lynch et al., supra note 6, at 6; Henderson, supra note 1, at 33; see also Matthew David
Disco, Note, The Impression of Possible Bias: What a Neutral Arbitrator Must Disclose in
California,45 HASTINGS L.J. 113 (1993).
18. Beerling, supra note 5, at 308.
19. Id.
20. Jennifer N. Manuszak,Pre-DisputeCivilRightsArbitration in the Nonunion Sector: The
Needfor a Tandem Reform Effort at the Contracting,Proceduraland JudicialReview Stages, 12
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 387, 389 (1997) (noting that employers generally embrace arbitration
as a "cost-effective forum for resolving employment related disputes").
21. Siderman, supranote 4, at 1894; see also Theodore J. St. Antoine, MandatoryArbitration
of Employee DiscriminationClaims: UnmitigatedEvil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY
L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1998).
22. Siderman, supra note 4, at 1894.
23. Id. at 1894-95.
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resolve their disputes, but a mandatory arbitration system provides
employees with a forum to have their problems addressed.24
C. Drawbacks of Mandatory Arbitration
Despite these benefits, when mandatory arbitration is applied to Title
VII rights or other statutory rights, the end result is problematic. One
problem is that there is a lack of public accountability in mandatory
arbitration because "[a]rbitrators are not required to issue written
' Without written decisions, judicial review is nonexistent and
decisions."25
the protections afforded under Title VH are diminished.26 Related to this
concern is the absence of a jury in mandatory arbitration.27 If mandatory
arbitration is the way Title VII matters are routinely handled, then
employees' lose their right to have their cases heard by a panel of their
peers. The loss of that right runs counter to the Civil Rights Act of 1991
which made the right to jury trial available in employment cases.28
Another problem is that there is limited discovery in mandatory
arbitrations.2 9 Because most Title VH claims are difficult hard to prove
without substantial discovery, many Title VH claims are lost in the
arbitration process due to a lack of evidence.3" Additionally, even if an
employee wins a case in mandatory arbitration, the damages available may
be limited by the arbitration provision.31 Again, this disadvantage cut
against the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which permits the recovery of both
compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII cases.

24. Id.at 1894. For a discussion of the benefits of mandatory arbitration of employment
disputes, see generally David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of MandatoryArbitrationof Employment
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the
Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999).
25. Siderman, supra note 4, at 1911.
26. Id. at 1911-12.
27. Id. at 1914-15.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., W. Scott Simpson & Omer Kesikli, The Contours ofArbitrationDiscovery, 67
ALA. LAW. 280, 280-81 (2006) (recognizing the limited nature of discovery in arbitration
proceedings).
30. Siderman, supra note 4, at 1913.
31. Id. at 1917.
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III. LEGAL BASIS FOR MANDATORY
ARBITRATION IN THE WORKPLACE

A. FederalArbitrationAct

Generally, most mandatory arbitration employment provisions are
upheld.32 In specific cases, the provisions may be unenforceable under
general contract defenses, such as substantive and procedural
unconscionability,33 but these cases are rare.34 The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),35 which was originally enacted in 1925, allows the federal courts

to uphold mandatory arbitration provisions in employment agreements.

6

The FAA expressly provides as follows: "[a] written provision in ...a

contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable .... Prior to

32. Id. at 1894-95.
33. Lynch et al., supra note 6, at 17.
34. Siderman, supra note 4, at 1894.
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925). This Article addresses only the FAA and the enforcement of preemployment arbitration agreements regarding federal substantive rights. Many states have statutes
that are based on the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955 and embrace the enforcement of arbitration
clauses generally. See J. Kirkland Grant, Securities Arbitration: Is Required Arbitration Fairto
Investors, 24 NEWENGLANDL. REv. 389,469-70 (1989) (recognizing that the uniform law validates
arbitration agreements and forty-five states have enacted some variation of the uniform law).
Historically the states, and the federal courts prior to the FAA, played a parental role by passing
laws that expressly forbade the enforcement of agreements that required arbitration of future
disputes. Alabama, for example, has such a statute. ALA. CODE § 8-1-41 (1975). However, courts
have found that when interstate commerce is impacted by the application of such state statutes, the
statutes are pre-empted by the FAA. See Cent. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Fox, 869 So. 2d 1124, 1125,
1127 (Ala. 2003). In reality, these state law provisions become virtually meaningless because
federal courts tend to broadly interpret interstate commerce. See id.
36. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925).
37. Id. The section provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
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the FAA, courts were hostile toward the enforcement of arbitration
provisions.38 However, federal courts have interpreted the FAA's language
to constitute a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. 39
In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly found that, under the FAA,
Congress "declared a national policy favoring arbitration."'
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Several Supreme Court cases have applied FAA analysis to mandatory
arbitration provisions in the employment context. In 1974, the Supreme
Court considered whether employees can prospectively waive their Title
VII rights in the context of a collective bargaining agreement.4' In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,42 the Court refused to ignore an
employee's right to a trial of a Title VII claim even though the employee's
claim was submitted to arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement. 43 The Court reasoned that "federal courts have been assigned
plenary powers to secure compliance with Title VII," and that cutting off
such rights through a contractual waiver impeded the powers ofthe federal
courts. 45 Although Alexander involved a collective bargaining agreement
with a mandatory arbitration provision, it can be used to support the
argument that individual employment contracts with prospective waivers
of Title VII rights should not eliminate an employee's right to seek redress
in federal courts.

38. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) ("Congress enacted the FAA
in 1925. As the Court has explained, the FAA was a response to hostility of American courts to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements, a judicial disposition inherited from then-longstanding
English practice."); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,270 (1995)
("[Tihe basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts' refusals to enforce
agreements to arbitrate." (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989))).
39. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,25 (1991) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
40. Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 281, 286 (2002) (quoting to Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
41. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
42. Id.
43. Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment Relationship
Considered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 496 (2001).
44. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 445.
45. See id.
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Despite the Alexander decision, in 1991,' the Supreme Court embraced
mandatory arbitration of Title VH claims.47 In Gilmerv. InterstateJohnson
Lane Corp.,a8 as a condition of employment, an employee was required to
sign a securities industry registration form which included an arbitration
agreement to resolve all disputes. 49 Thereafter, the employee was fired and
he asserted an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim.
Even though the arbitration agreement was a part of the securities industry
registration form to which the employer was not a signatory, ° the
employer was successfully able to argue that the ADEA claim should be
resolved by arbitration. The Court enforced the arbitration agreement
relying on the presumption in favor of contractually-based arbitration
agreements," and the strong FAA policy favoring arbitration.52 The Gilmer
Court clearly embraced mandatory arbitration of statutory rights, but it did
not decide whether the same holding would be applied to mandatory
arbitration provisions in employment contracts. 3 Nevertheless, many
lower federal courts have used Gilmer as authority to enforce mandatory
arbitration provisions regarding employment law claims.54 However, those
lower federal courts were55 not in agreement and their decisions generated
a clear split of authority.
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided to mend the split.56 In Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams,57 the Court addressed whether the broad policy in
favor of arbitration found in the FAA should be applied to mandatory
arbitration in the employment context. 58 The Court examined the proarbitration policy of the FAA and recognized that there are significant
benefits from enforcing arbitration provisions in the employment context. 9

46. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
47. Beerling, supra note 5, at 311.
48. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
49. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
50. Id. at 23-24.
51. Id. at 24, 35.
52. Beerling, supra note 5, at 311.
53. Id. at 312. The arbitration provision in question was not part of an employment contract.
See id.
54. Silverstein, supra note 43, at 497-98.
55. Susan W. Kline & Ellen E. Boshkoff, Survey of Employment Law Developments for
IndianaPractitioners,35 IND. L. REv. 1369, 1411 (2002).
56. Beerling, supra note 5, at 312.
57. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
58. Id.
59. Henry S. Kramer, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Workplace, § 1.02,
http://www.westlaw.com (retrieved Sept. 21, 2008).
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Furthermore, the Court did not want to open the gates of litigation when
the FAA was enacted to avoid litigation.6" In its 5-4 decision, the Circuit
City Court interpreted the broad congressional mandate of the FAA to
apply to all contracts of employment unless the contract was exempt by the
FAA.6 The Court's decision reinforced the case law from lower federal
courts that encouraged the use of mandatory arbitration.62
The Circuit City decision clarified the broad scope of the FAA63 and
seemed to affirm employers' use of mandatory arbitration provisions in
employment contracts. Following Circuit City, many employers felt
confident that they did not need to "worry that the arbitration agreements
they include in contracts of employment will be subject to attack."
However, this confidence was short lived. In 2002, the Supreme Court
added another wrinkle to the use of mandatory arbitration provisions in
employment contracts with its EEOCv. Waffle House, Inc decision.65 The
ramification of Waffle House is a matter of debate. Some scholars have
argued that the pro-employer decision of CircuitCity was tempered by the
pro-employee Waffle House decision.66 However, only time will
demonstrate the true impact of the Waffle House decision on mandatory
arbitration provisions in employment contracts.
C. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. 67
Under Circuit City, it is settled that absent some state law defense to a
mandatory arbitration provision in an employment contract, employees are
bound by the provision.6" However, an important issue left open was
whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) would
be bound by a mandatory arbitration agreement entered into by the
employee and thus, precluded from enforcing statutory claims under Title
VII. This was the issue presented to the Supreme Court in Waffle House.6 9

60. Id.
61. Id.at 123-24. The FAA provides a limited exemption applicable only to employment
contracts of transportation workers. Id.at 122-23.
62. Id.at 112.
63. Kline & Boshkoff, supra note 55, at 1412.
64. Barry A. Naum, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 225,225
(2002) (quoting Charity Robl, Recent Development, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 17 OHIo
ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 219 (2001)).
65. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
66. See Naum, supra note 64, at 225.
67. 539 U.S. 279 (2002).
68. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. 105.
69. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 282.
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In Waffle House, an employee, as a condition of employment, signed
an arbitration agreement which provided that "any dispute or claim" would
be "settled by binding arbitration. "70 The employee began work at Waffle
House, and a few weeks later had a seizure at work. Shortly thereafter, the
employee was terminated.7" The employee did not initiate arbitration over
the termination; however, the employee did file a complaint of
discrimination with the EEOC asserting that he was terminated in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990.72 The EEOC,
failing to conciliate the dispute, filed an action in federal court alleging
that Waffle House terminated the employee because of the employee's
disability.73 The complaint, to which the employee was not a party,74
sought injunctive relief to stop the alleged discriminatory practice, victimspecific relief "designed to make [the employee] whole,"75 and "damages
for [Waffle House's] malicious and reckless conduct. 7 6 Waffle House
sought to compel the EEOC to arbitration of the claims.77
The lower court denied Waffle House's request to compel arbitration.
The court of appeals held that a valid arbitration agreement in place
between the employer and employee "did not foreclose the enforcement
action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, and it has
independent statutory authority to bring suit."78 The court of appeals
qualified this holding by making a distinction between the EEOC seeking
injunctive relief, and the EEOC seeking victim-specific relief. 9 The court
of appeals ruled that the EEOC was not permitted to seek victim-specific
relief in light of the arbitration agreement.8" However, the court of appeals
explained that when the EEOC is seeking to pursue injunctive relief, the
public interest overrides the arbitration agreement, and the EEOC is
permitted to seek injunctive relief even if the employee has entered into a
valid arbitration agreement. 8'

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
damages.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. (quoting the mandatory arbitration agreement at issue).
Id.
Id.
Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
Id.
Id.at 283-84. Victim-specific reliefs include back-pay, reinstatement, and compensatory
Id.
Id. at 284.
See id.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 534 U.S. 284-85.
Id.
Id.
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In a 6-3 holding, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.82
The Court agreed that the EEOC can certainly seek injunctive relief, but
held that mandatory arbitration provisions "in employment contracts
cannot preclude the EEOC from pursing relief on behalf of a complaining
employee, even if that relief is considered to be 'victim-specific' .....
In reaching this holding, the Court balanced the competing policies of
the FAA and Title VII. The Court found that Title VII "makes the EEOC
the master of its own case," and that the FAA "does not mention
enforcement by public agencies; it [only] ensures the enforceability of
private agreements to arbitrate...
D. PracticalRamifications of Waffle House
There are several practical ramifications of the Waffle House decision.
The case appears to be a break in the line of decisions that favored
mandatory arbitration provisions in the employment context, but the end
result may be just the opposite. 5 The decision may lead to an increase in
the use of mandatory arbitration in the workplace.86 First, the decision
embraced mandatory arbitration generally. This was slightly qualified by
the Court for claims sharing Waffle House's limited fact pattern involving
an EEOC enforcement of important public rights protected by Title VII
and the ADA.87 In those situations, the EEOC would not be bound by the
arbitration agreement.88 However, it is not clear whether other public
agencies can use the Waffle House decision to enforce other statutory
rights when there is a valid arbitration agreement between the employee
and the employer.8 9
Second, in most situations, the EEOC does not litigate cases. The
EEOC files only less than one percent of enforcement suits annually.9"
Thus, the Waffle House decision will certainly not open the floodgates of

82.
(2002).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Gary Mathiason & George Wood, 'Waffle House': Long View, 24 NAT'L L.J. A23
Naum, supra note 64, at 227 (quoting Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. at 760).
Id. at 289.
Naum, supra note 64, at 233.
Mathiason & Wood, supra note 82.
Naum, supra note 64, at 23-34.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Id.

MANDATORY PRE-EMPLOYMENTARBITRATJON

AGREEMENTS

litigation. Rather, the decision will probably have little impact on
discouraging the use of mandatory arbitration in the employment context. 9'
Third, the decision undermines one of the strong arguments against
mandatory arbitration in the workplace: lack of judicial review of the
underlying dispute.92 Waffle House protects the oversight role of the EEOC
in workplace-discrimination issues. 93 Even with a valid arbitration
agreement in place, the EEOC's oversight role will most likely present
opportunities for the federal courts to give guidance on workplacediscrimination issues when the EEOC seeks relief 9' After Waffle House,
it can be argued that arbitration, coupled with the EEOC's oversight, an
adequate safeguard against abusive employer practices, 95 will lead to a fair
resolution of most Title VII cases. 96
Finally, the decision changes the role of the EEOC. 97 The EEOC has
traditionally opposed mandatory arbitration in the workplace.98 Now, the
EEOC will most likely issue guidelines regarding mandatory arbitration
in the workplace which will help standardize due process requirements and
eliminate some of the enforcement barriers to mandatory arbitration
provisions.99 Arguably, such guidelines will help smaller companies and
less sophisticated employers implement mandatory arbitration into
employment contracts.
Beyond these effects on the system generally, the Waffle House
decision will impact the behavior of both employees and employers. It will
encourage employees to file complaints with the EEOC even if they have
arbitration agreements.' 0 Thus, the decision, in effect, gives employees
two bites at an apple: one bite through the arbitration process and another

91. Id. at 235.
92. Mathiason & Wood, supra note 82.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. This supports the Court's distinction in Gilmer between substantive rights and
selecting a mechanism for resolving disputes. See Gilmore v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 26 (1991). Employers can now argue with good authority that substantive rights under
Title VII are adequately protected even when employees are required to sign mandatory arbitration
provisions. See id. Employers can claim that their employees' substantive rights are protected by
the arbitration process and EEOC's oversight. Id.
96. Id.
97. Mathiason & Wood, supra note 82.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Kline & Boshkoff, supra note 55, at 1413.
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through the EEOC. However, the second bite at the apple is tenuous in
light of the EEOC's history of limited enforcement.'0 '
In addition, there are several practical implications for employers to
consider in light of Waffle House. Employers are encouraged to take
advantage of the Supreme Court's general approval of mandatory
arbitration, and they are encouraged to develop an alternative dispute
resolution program that includes mandatory arbitration.0 2 The program
should include procedures that are balanced between the employer and
employee so that the program can be defended against EEOC initiated
claims.' O3 Particularly, employers should ensure that the same basic
remedies available in litigation are also available in arbitration." They
should also allow limited discovery and allow employees to participate in
the process of selecting an arbitrator.0 5 Furthermore, the employer should
have an employee responsible for keeping the program and its policies
current; 106 a greater emphasis should be placed on EEOC charges and the
employer should invest resources to resolve matters with the EEOC prior
to litigation.10 7 These mechanisms would add validity to the arbitration
process. Nevertheless, in the long run, Waffle House will likely benefit
employers,'0 8 and at a minimum, it will represent a victory for arbitration
generally.' 09
IV. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES

The Waffle House decision is a half blessing for employees. While it
provides the opportunity for the EEOC to pursue victim-specific remedies,
those cases are not common." 0 Moreover, at its core, the decision is an
endorsement of the use of mandatory arbitration in the employment

101. See Naum, supra note 64, at 234.
102. Mathiason & Wood, supra note 82.
103. See id.
104. 0. LEE REED ET AL., THE LEGAL & REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF BusINEss 470-71
(13th ed. 2005).
105. Id.
106. See Mathiason & Wood, supra note 82.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Naum, supra note 64, at 235.
110. Statistics indicate that the EEOC only brings suit in a small number of cases, perhaps as
lowas 1%. SeeJoyce E. Taber, Comment, An UnansweredQuestionAbout MandatoryArbitration:
Should a Mandatory Arbitration Clause Preclude the EEOC from Seeing Monetary Reliefon an
Employee's Behalf in a Title VII Case?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 281, 317-18 (2000).
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context. The Court's endorsement raises serious public policy issues
regarding Title VII and other statutory claims.
Mandatory arbitration of such vital rights threatens an employee's
" ' The decisions of Waffle
constitutional right of access to the courts.11
House and earlier cases essentially eliminate this right for employees
subject to mandatory arbitration provisions. 12 The requirement to resolve
disputes, even disputes regarding vital matters,' 13 without a trial trumps the
employees' right to have their disputes heard by a jury." 4 It maybe a wise
public policy to encourage alternative dispute resolution techniques.115
However, when that particular public policy trumps the opportunity for a
jury trial, a more serious public policy concern exists.
Another issue is raised when Title VII rights such are resolved through
mandatory arbitration." 6 Although Waffle House permits the EEOC to
bring victim-specific claims, the decision strikes an individual's right to
bring such claims on their own by endorsing mandatory arbitration
provisions in employment contracts. 117 As a result, the Court weakens the
employees' abilities to eliminate or curb employment discrimination
through individual action. Additionally, under some mandatory arbitration
provisions employees may be required to pay the costs and fees of the
arbitration process if they lose. Such requirements may chill the
employees' willingness to enforce their substantive rights in large legal
expenses at the end of the process.118

111. Feingold, supra note 40, at 288.
112. See, e.g., id. at 290-92 (discussing the prior Supreme Court jurisprudence in the
employment and arbitration arena, and how such cases have led to an expansion of mandatory
arbitration in the employment context).
113. Such as age discrimination, sexual harassment or employment discrimination. See id. at
291.
114. See, e.g., id. at 290 (alluding that this result is based on statutory rights to a jury trial
being eliminated through pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment domain).
115. Id. at 283-84.
Because such [arbitration] alternatives streamline adjudicative procedures and
allow parties to have their case heard long before a possible court trial, these
alternatives enable parties to resolve disputes expeditiously. These alternatives,
thus, have merit when they provide efficiency and the voluntary choice ofwhether
or not to go to court.
Id.
116. Lynch et al.,supranote 6, at 18.
117. See, e.g., id.
118. See Stephani Armour, College GradConfront Tough Job Market, USA TODAY, June 12,
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Additionally, the use of mandatory arbitration provisions in
employment applications" 9 creates an uneven playing field between
employers and potential employees. Including such provisions in
applications for employment is a major flaw, and it is unfair to
employees.120 Most potential employees have no bargaining power, and

even if they are aware of the provision and its ramifications, they must
accept it."' Despite these concerns, most courts embrace the validity of
these provisions absent some specific contract law defense. 22 Preemployment mandatory arbitration agreement raises strong public policy
issues regardless of the availability of specific contract law defenses.
These considerations make mandatory arbitration in the employment
context difficult to justify. Nevertheless, the preference for arbitration is
entrenched in the law and its use is not considered a contravention of
public policy. 123 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that "there is no broad
' 24
judicial power to set aside an arbitration award as against public policy.'
The values of equity, fairness, and justice appear to be lost in favor of
efficiency. Perhaps, over time the dominant values of efficiency and
economy will shift, and justice will become the courts' primary focus.
V. CONCLUSION

Congress has the ability to address the public policy concerns that arise
from the application of the FAA to mandatory arbitration provisions in
2001, at 1B. Some estimate that arbitrator fees for enforcement of employee statutory rights range
from $3000 to $25,000, and perhaps much more than this in complex cases. See Clyde W.
Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to
Arbitrate,6 U. PA. J. LAB.EMP. L. 685, 697-98 (2004). Certainly the risk of incurring such costs
will serve to chill the advancement of some claims by employees. For a discussion of the courts,
differing views on this issue, see generally Effect of Agreements to Arbitrate Generally, 8 EMP.
COORD. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 95:71 (Sept. 2008).
119. For example, Circuit City Stores, Inc. includes mandatory arbitration provisions in
employment applications. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109-10 (2001).
120. Lynch et al., supra note 6, at 14.
121. Granted the potential employee does not have to sign the agreement, however, if the
employee wishes to be considered for the job, they need to complete the application. There does
not seem to be a great deal of bargaining power in the typical job application process so that the
terms of the application, included mandatory arbitration provisions, can be negotiated.
122. Id. at 17.
123. The Supreme Court recently recognized the strong national public policy in favor of
arbitration in both state and federal courts. See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S.Ct. 978, 983 (2008).
124. Lynch et al., supra note 6, at 18-19 (quoting United Pipeworker Int'l Union v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987)).
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individual employment contracts. There is pending legislation, the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007,125 in both the House and Congress,
which would eliminate the viability of predispute mandatory arbitration in
employment disputes. 126 The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 is based on
findings that the FAA was intended to resolve disputes of commercial
entities with the same bargaining power and level of sophistication, and
that the Supreme Court has extended the FAA to disputes between parties
with limited bargaining power. 127 Congress should make this legislation
law and properly balance the policy goals of the FAA and Title VII. An
emphasis on values other than efficiency and economy is needed.
Mandatory arbitration provisions in the context of pre-employment
contracts should be made illegal in regard to Title VH statutory rights.
There have been prior attempts by some members of Congress to overturn
some of the holdings that embrace mandatory employment arbitration, but
these attempts have been unsuccessful. 28 It seems that the desire to
embrace arbitration and the policy goals of FAA have overshadowed all
other concerns. There needs to be a rebalancing of interests: efficiency and
economy versus the protection of important substantive rights. Hopefully,
this reform effort will be more successful than past endeavors.
The lack of successful congressional reform has probably been the
result of Congress's inability to properly define the problem' 29 in a way
that envinces broad support. Today, employers appear to control the policy
process in this area, and they do not see mandatory arbitration as a
problem. They view litigation to be the problem; in their view, litigation
is a never-ending battle with an unpredictable outcome and costs. 3 0 The
employers' solution to this is to implement pre-employment arbitration
125. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007).
126. American Association for Justice, Momentum Builds in Congress to End Mandatory
Arbitration, 44 TRIAL 12 (2008).
127. See Joseph M. Matthews, Are Florida Courts Really Parochial When it Comes to
Arbitration?,81 FLA. B.J. 29, 33 (2007).
128. Kline & Boshkoff, supra note 55, at 1412.
129. Problem definition is arguably the most important part of any policymaking process. The
definition of the problems leads policymakers to a particular solution. For a discussion of this in
the consumer bankruptcy policy domain, see generally Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy andForces
Behind Consumer BankruptcyReform: A ClassicBattle Over Problem Definition,33 U. MEM. L.
REv. 509 (2003).
130. See, e.g., Steven M. Kaufmann & John A. Chanin, Directingthe Flood: The Arbitration
of Employment Claims, 10 LAB. LAW. 217, 218-19 (1994) (recognizing the increased number of
employment law cases in federal court which are driven by the availability of damage awards and
recognizing the benefits of arbitration of such claims in terms of time, cost and predictability).
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the FAA in employment,
provisions. 3 ' The FAA and case law interpreting
32
solution.
this
embrace
matters
related
As in many policy areas, there appears to be a lack of power on the part
of the groups most harmed by the current policy. Thus, meaningful wellbalanced reform must take place. Employees do not have the ability to recharacterize the problem. Employees whose rights are contracted away are
the ones that may seek reform, but their lack of power and their inability
to organize leave their interests largely unrepresented.
Until Congress articulates a clear change in the law as proposed in the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, the case law will continue to produce
inconsistent results that will continue down individual employee rights in
favor of mandatory arbitration. The interest of the "public," as a whole,
has been placed second to the interests of employers with power, money,
and time to control the public policy process. Hopefully, the current
interest of Congress in reforming the FAA will lead to meaningful
legislative changes. 133 Unfortunately, this has not been the case to date.
Absent a successful reform effort, employees will continue to have their
statutory rights "scattered, smothered, and covered" with no more care or
concern given to them than that of an order of hashbrowns at Waffle
House.

131. For a discussion of the benefits of arbitration for the employer, see generally Kaufman
& Chanin, supra note 130, at 219. These benefits certainly help make arbitration a viable solution
to the problem of unpredictable and costly litigation.
132. As with most policy domains, Kingdon's streams analogy is applicable. For a discussion
of Kingdon's streams analogy, see J.W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES
(1984). The "policy solution to a perceived problem can only be obtained by the convergence of
the political stream, policy stream and problem stream so that a window of opportunity opens for
reform to occur." Robert J. Landry, III, An Empirical Analysis of the Causes of Consumer
Bankruptcy: WillBankruptcyReform Really ChangeAnything?,3 RUTGERS Bus. L.J. 2 n.3 (2006).
Here, the solution is a more permissive use of mandatory pre-employment arbitration, and is a
politically acceptable solution due to the disdain of our overly litigious society. See, e.g., Lance P.
McMillian, The Elusive Truth anda Clarifying Proposal,31 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 221,224 & 226
(2007) (discussing the general consensus of litigation abuse as perceived by society). Until the
nature of the problem is redefined, the solution and political streams will not change. For a
discussion ofthe streams analogy, see generally THoMAs A. BIRKLAND, AFrER DISASTER: AGENDA
SETTING, PUBLIC POLICY AND FOCUSING EVENTS 6-10 (1997).
133. For a discussion of the current interest of Congress and need for reform, see generally
Jean R. Stemlight, Introduction:DreamingAbout ArbitrationReform, 8 NEV. L.J. 1 (2007).

